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Abstract
The Bush and Obama administrations have complemented their capacity to make
public appeals by creating grassroots lobbying organizations with the explicit purpose
of mobilizing supporters to pressure Congress to pass presidential policy priorities. This
paper advances the study of organizations like Organizing for Action by considering
their ability to make targeted appeals to the primary electorate of the president’s party
as well as orchestrate indirect mass persuasion campaigns. Furthermore, this paper
defines the costs of lobbying in terms of those tactics’ electoral costs. I present a model
which predicts that targeted appeals will be more common under unified government
and that mass persuasion attempts will be less common as the organizational capital
of these organizations can be efficiently applied to electoral ends. The model also
predicts that public appeals become less common as the time costs and relative electoral
productivity of presidential time increase. I find empirical support for these hypotheses
in data obtained from emails sent by Organizing for America/Organizing for Action
to subscribers since its creation in early 2009 and in presidential primetime addresses
made since 1957.
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“[OFA] may make [Obama] the most powerful president of modern times. Never
before has a president been directly connected to that many Americans.” -Former
Howard Dean Campaign Manager Joe Trippi in December 2008 (Salant, 2008)
“It’s clear that Obama recognizes the power that his email list, which boasts
more than 13 million names, represents in American politics.” -Washington Post
columnist Chris Cillizza in January 2009 (Cillizza, 2009)
On June 14th, 2013, Organizing for Action mobilized more than a thousand people to at-
tend nearly 80 public events around the country to commemorate the six-month anniversary
of the Newtown shooting incident, which occurred in December 2012 (Sink, 2013). These
efforts to build public support for stronger gun control legislation comprised only some of the
organization’s efforts to enact a package of stricter gun control measures, which also included
collecting 1.4 million signatures for a pro-gun control petition with the intent of pressuring
Congress (Aigner-Treworgy, 2013). Furthermore, throughout 2013, Organizing for Action
emails requested individuals to talk to their neighbors about gun violence and encourage
them to put pressure on Congress to act on the president’s proposals. Despite these efforts
to indirectly persuade the public and appeal to Democratic voters through OFA’s massive
email list, no gun control measure passed (according to OFA leaders, as a result of lobbying
by the NRA and allies)1.
Organizing for Action, and its predecessor, Organizing for America, are grassroots lob-
bying organizations created to help President Obama achieve policy success in Congress.
1Organizing for Action has been criticized for falling short of the high hopes that political observers once
held for it (Bump, 2014). The competitive environment may result in opposition success even if the tactics
OFA offers to the president improve his utility (Pluta and Woolley, 2014), but this is a subject for another
paper.
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Both presidential grassroots lobbying organizations (PGLOs) were created from President
Obama’s 2012 and 2008 election campaign organizations, respectively, drawing on the email
lists, websites, neighborhood team leaders, field offices, and even some paid staff from the
earlier campaign (Melber, 2010; Blumenthal, 2013). The group, in both manifestations,
does a number of very interesting and apparently novel things to mobilize its members to
lead opinion in the general electorate on behalf of the president, and to selectively expose
Democrats and their close ties to policy appeals from the President, using resources that
are leftover from the prior campaign and used for subsequent federal elections. Since its cre-
ation in 2009, OFA has campaigned in support of the 2009 stimulus package, the Affordable
Care Act, the nominations of Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, financial services reform,
cap-and-trade legislation, the president’s 2011 jobs bill, gun control, and comprehensive im-
migration reform, among other issues. These campaigns were executed in a wide variety of
ways, with organized rallies, persuasion of neighbors, petition drives, issue-linked commu-
nity service, and most importantly, contacting of legislators. It is also very important to
note that in 2010 and 2014, OFA was almost exclusively oriented toward supporting Demo-
cratic candidates in the federal election over policy issues, and in 2011, OFA was nominally
dismantled and rebranded as the Obama-Biden 2012 campaign organization.
Despite the apparent novelty of OFA’s tactics, goals, and scope in the minds of political
operatives and columnists like Joe Trippi and Chris Cillizza, these tactics are not revolution-
ary. From 2001 until 2005, President George W. Bush maintained his own PGLO, called GOP
Team Leader, which used the Bush-Cheney 2000 and 2004 email lists to organize Republican
activists on behalf of presidential priorities (Edwards, 2007). This organization, though less
technologically sophisticated than OFA, organized campaign style events on behalf of Social
Security reform, and incentivized political action (including letters to the editor and voter
registration) by members with a points system (which OFA also did early in its existence).
The organization distributed fact sheets and messages from President Bush to members on
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issues selected by the president, and engaged in some rudimentary (and panned) efforts to
organize members to persuade the public (Roddy, 2003). While President Clinton did not
have a formal PGLO, the capacity of the president to make targeted appeals to his own
party’s primary electorate/selectorate has existed in some form for most of American his-
tory, including the availability of direct mail from the late 1970s onward, the Office of Public
Liason’s work with interest group allies from the 1960s, and presidential control of partisan
newspapers during the 19th century (Godwin, 1988; Peterson, 1992; Skocpol, 1997; Hult and
Walcott, 2004; Mieczkowski, 2005; Edwards, 2007, 2009; Merry, 2009; Eshbaugh-Soha, 2011).
The rise of candidate-centered politics and the decline of local party organizations has also
obscured the capacity of party leaders to mobilize supporters to persuade the public, and
while for most of the 20th century these indirect mass persuasion attempts were too costly
to be practical to the president, technology may be allowing modern presidents in their role
as party leader to revert back to an older norm (Wattenberg, 1984; Howe, 2007; Merry, 2009;
Wood, 2009; Morris, 2010).
If we take the leaders of OFA at their word that their efforts matter, we find that
presidents and party leaders have utilized different methods throughout the history of the
United States to pursue the goals of making targeted appeals to their own party primary
electorate or selectorates and using supporters to act as surrogates in opinion leadership,
often by diverting organizational capital from campaigns to do so. This paper examines how
our theories of tactic selection in the public presidency may be enriched by consideration
of these avenues of influence. Furthermore, this paper will investigate the degree to which
President Obama, equipped with a sophisticated PGLO, behaves as if these avenues of
influence are effective, and the degree to which recent presidents have varied their use public
appeals based on the electoral costs of that tactic. I find that targeted appeals occur most
frequently under unified government, when such appeals are plausible tools of influence on
Congress. I also find support for the claim that indirect mass persuasion attempts decrease
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in frequency as federal elections grow near (and thus the electoral productivity of OFA’s
organizational capital increase), and increased in President Obama’s second term, when his
utility from winning future elections would presumably be lower. Finally, results suggest
that public appeals occur less often when elections are near and also when Internet use
is greater, which raises the amount of time presidents must spend making those appeals.
Across the three tactics examined, circumstances which decrease the electoral resource cost
of these tactics are associated with increases in presidents’ use of those tactics.
The strong expectations of observers regarding OFA’s ability to influence Congress and
policy outcomes on behalf of the president, as well as the significant efforts made by recent
presidents in developing PGLOs, make it a useful case for identifying previously unconsidered
tools available to presidents as well as the costs of using those tools. When the activities of
OFA and GOP Team Leader are considered in light of the existing literature on the public
presidency, a number of intriguing pathways for inquiry are revealed. I will do this in the
next section.
Literature Review
The modern study of the public presidency is well represented by two major works published
since the mid 1980s: George C. Edwards’ On Deaf Ears and Samuel Kernell’s Going Public.
These books asked and made great strides to answer two key questions in the area: can
presidents achieve policy success by altering the policy positions held by the electorate, and
can they achieve policy success by altering the salience of issues on the agenda? With respect
to the former, Edwards argued that the president was largely unable to broadly persuade the
public to adopt his position on major issues (Edwards III, 2006) On the latter, Kernell argued
that presidents are able to gain substantial policy gains when they are popular through the
threat or activation of their ability to go over the heads of legislators and directly ask voters to
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pressure their elected officials to support the president’s position (Kernell, 2007). According
to a three-part framework for theories of the public presidency articulated by Cameron, these
questions seek to understand the mechanisms of message reach and opinion change through
opinion leadership or salience manipulation, respectively (Cameron and Park, 2011).
Recent work by Matthew Beckmann on presidential lobbying examined Cameron’s third
component of public presidency theories, the influence of an activated public on legislation
(Beckmann, 2008; Cameron and Park, 2011). Beckmann separated the many lobbying tactics
available to the president into lobbying activities that seek to win votes for a policy on
the floor of Congress and lobbying activities that target congressional leadership in order
to ensure that the president’s policy is on the agenda (Beckmann, 2008). This distinction
between vote-centered lobbying and agenda-centered lobbying is a very useful one, as it allows
scholars to distinguish between efforts by presidents to win over individuals who are pivotal
in setting the agenda and efforts to win over individuals who are pivotal in floor votes once
they are scheduled.
PGLOs like GOP Team Leader, Organizing for America and Organizing for Action have
taken a number of steps to activate the public to put pressure on congressional agenda-
setters. Since early 2011, when Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives
and Representative John Boehner became Speaker, OFA leaders sent a number of messages
to its members asking them to sign petitions in support of gun control and climate change
legislation which would be given to Speaker Boehner(Klingler, 2014) . However, there has
never been a sustained or even repeated effort to put pressure on Senate Majority Leader
Reid, Senate Minority Leader McConnell, or Representative Nancy Pelosi when she was
Speaker of the House or House Minority Leader after 2011(Klingler, 2014) . There are a
number of reasons why OFA may have dedicated relatively little effort to targeting congres-
sional leadership. In any event, the activities of OFA are overwhelmingly dedicated to tactics
that would be classified as vote-centered lobbying. Thus, I will focus on how presidents use
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PGLOs to engage in opinion leadership and salience manipulation in pursuit of vote-centered
lobbying.
Framework for Presidential Decision-Making
One of the most influential contributions to the literature on vote-centered lobbying, specifi-
cally in the area of salience manipulation, has been Brandice Canes-Wrone’s work on public
appeals (Canes-Wrone, 2001b,a, 2006). Canes-Wrone extends the Romer-Rosenthal model of
legislative bargaining to allow the president to make a public appeal (Romer and Rosenthal,
1978). The president’s public appeal raises the salience of the issue under consideration in
the opinion of the general electorate. This in turn is assumed to induce a unitary legislature
to be more responsive to the views of the public on the issue under consideration. Accord-
ingly, when the president makes a public appeal in the Canes-Wrone model, the action leads
the legislature to adopt the ideal point of general electorate. In many cases, this allows the
president to earn substantial policy gains from public appeals, as well as from the threat of
public appeals in a two-stage game (Canes-Wrone, 2001a).
Substantial empirical support was also found for many of the implications of this theo-
retical model and other similar approaches, suggesting that public appeals are effective in
helping presidents achieve their policy ends in practice (Canes-Wrone, 2001b; Barrett, 2004;
Canes-Wrone, 2006; Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha, 2007; Holmes, 2007, 2008). However, due
to changes in the media environment, primetime speeches are becoming less effective in
reaching the public (Baum and Kernell, 1999; Cummins, 2010). As a result, in order to
successfully engage in public appeals, major primetime addresses to the public are now only
a part of the public appeals process, and presidents must extend their public appeals to
local and specialized media outlets, which requires substantial and increasing allocations
of presidential time (Cohen, 2010). Given that presidential time is limited, the time spent
appearing in some local media putting pressure on some legislators can’t be spent in other
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local media campaigning for others.
The Canes-Wrone model offers a clear framework with which to consider other vote-
centered tactics that might be available to the president, both in terms of the circumstances
under which each may be valuable, and what tradeoffs exist when the president must weigh
one tactic against another. There are a number of concepts that stand out about PGLOs that
merit consideration using this theoretical framework. The leaders of presidential grassroots
lobbying organizations have been criticized for using their organizations to put pressure on
wayward legislators of their own party, which is sensible considering these organizations are
structured so they are best situated to reach their own party’s supporters and activists, voters
whose opinion is valued by the president’s copartisans in Congress but not the opposition
(Jaffe, 2013). In addition, the leaders of these organizations frequently and consistently assert
that PGLOs are capable of leading public opinion through large, campaign-style efforts to
persuade the public (Plouffe, 2009; Bump, 2014). Finally, PGLOs’ emergence from, and
later re-integration into, campaign organizations suggests that the process of engaging in
grassroots lobbying efforts is linked to presidential utility from future elections (Cillizza,
2009). The recent behavior of these organizations, as well as the increasing time costs of
public appeals suggests that presidents believe they are able to engage in vote-centered
tactics of a hitherto unexamined nature. These tactics may manipulate the salience of the
president’s party’s primary electorate and may use these organizations to indirectly lead
public opinion, but these efforts potentially come at a cost realized during future election
campaigns.
Targeted Partisan Appeals
The vote-centered lobbying tactics used by OFA are forms of grassroots lobbying tactics.
Grassroots lobbying tactics are executed when organizations mobilize their members and/or
the public to send costly signals to Congress in a manner that simulates an election (Kollman,
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1998). By mobilizing large numbers of voters to send costly signals to legislators, interest
groups are able to send a signal to legislators about the potential electoral costs/benefits
of voting a certain way on a bill. OFA is significantly different from a typical interest
group as the individual responsible for mobilizing members is the President of the United
States, who has a unique ability as the leader of the governing party to define the nature
of identification with his party as well as the public agenda (Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake,
2004). PGLOs consist of dedicated activists and local opinion leaders in the presidents’
party, and because of this, presidents may use these organizations to manipulate the salience
of particular issues only among his own party’s primary electorate2. This is done when
presidents send issue-based messages through email, which raise the salience of that issue
among recipients (as with public appeals) and request the recipient to contact Congress in
support of the President’s position on the matter3. It is well established that greater levels of
participation in the electorate induces legislative responsiveness, in line with this mechanism
(Martin and Claibourn, 2013).
Mass Persuasion Attempts
While OFA’s targeted appeals activities seek to manipulate issue salience in the president’s
primary electorate, OFA’s opinion leadership activities indirectly persuade the general elec-
torate to move toward the President’s position through group members. These efforts also use
the grassroots lobbying mechanism, but it is slightly more complex (Kollman, 1998). OFA
2OFA’s membership is almost synonymous with the group of Democratic party primary voters and ac-
tivists, so when these individuals directly contact Democratic legislators, this influences legislators through
the primary rather than the general election. Furthermore, these individuals are highly unlikely to vote for
Republican members under any circumstances, so direct contacting by OFA members would need to have an
extremely high cost to signal meaningful information about a Republican legislator’s chances in the general
election.
3OFA has 13 million list members, which is equivalent to the number of individuals who voted in Demo-
cratic primary elections in 2014 (O’Callaghan, 2014). OFA routinely asks (and trains) its activist members
to pass on information to friends and family, so it is likely that the vast majority of Democratic voters are
directly reachable by OFA or indirectly through its members (Kingdon, 1970)
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uses emails to organize members with staff support to contact unaffiliated citizens(Klingler,
2014) . The members use their credibility as neighbors to persuade these citizens to adopt
the presidential position on an issue and encourage the new converts to contact Congress in
some manner (Melber, 2010). It plausible that neighbors viewed to be less self-interested and
ideological may be more persuasive than the president and this indirect grassroots use of local
activists is a potentially viable option for presidential opinion leadership (Kingdon, 1970).
If these shifts occur, we have reason to believe legislators will respond to them (Kousser and
Masket, 2007). We generally have little support for the claim that presidents may directly
and broadly lead public opinion (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey, 1987; Edwards III, 2006; Ed-
wards, 2007, 2009; Edwards III, 2012), though temporary, issue specific, non-presidential,
and limited opinion leadership effects have been found (Wood, 2007; Bartels and Mutz, 2009;
Rottinghaus, 2009; Cohen, 2010; Tedin and Rodgers, 2011). The limited scope of presidential
opinion leadership effects found thus far suggest this technique of grassroots mass persua-
sion (called Neighbor-to-Neighbor by OFA) is potentially very important if effective (Melber,
2010)4.
Electoral Costs of Lobbying
When Organizing for America was created, its leaders claimed that its purpose was to help
advance President Obama’s agenda through Congress using the impressive organization used
to elect the president in 2008 (Plouffe, 2009; Melber, 2010). The same claim was made by
leaders of Organizing for Action when the group was founded in early 2013 (Blumenthal,
2013). Multiple observers suggested that the substantial organizational capital accumulated
in the Obama election operation could have a big impact in the legislative arena (Cillizza,
2009; Gold, 2013). In the opinions of OFA leaders and a number of expert observers, orga-
4Interestingly, there is some evidence to suggest that aware individuals who are most susceptible to the
influence of appeals on salience may be least open to persuasion, and that political messages may be most
effective in persuading low information individuals (Valentino, Hutchings and Williams, 2004).
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nizational capital which was useful in the production of electoral success could be diverted
into legislative success.
There are many reasons to believe the reverse is true is well, and that organizational
capital used by PGLOs could later be diverted to electoral ends. Interestingly, Organizing
for America was disbanded in 2011 and relaunched as the Obama-Biden 2012 re-election
campaign organization (Thomas, 2011). Furthermore, within one year of President George
W. Bush’s re-election, as Republican fortunes began to wane, GOP Team Leader was dis-
banded. Organizing for America placed full time state coordinators in swing states first, and
most of these coordinators eventually ended up becoming state level field directors for the
Obama-Biden re-election effort (Appleman, 2013; Hass, 2011). Additionally, in both 2010
and 2014, both incarnations of OFA placed a great amount of focus on mobilizing Democrats
for the midterm elections.
After years of intense grassroots lobbying activity by Organizing for America exhausted
many activists, the organization and the 2012 re-election campaign organization were de-
scribed as being smaller and less passionate (at least among some segments of the base),
but the remainder were determined and well trained (Melber, 2010; Trish, 2009; Davey and
Wines, 2012). PGLOs with high amounts of organizational capital are also free to engage
in efforts to shape the battlefield and manipulate the salience of issues in advance of an
election, much like the process articulated in Meguid’s 2005 work on niche parties. Thus,
there is some reason to believe that the high tempo of OFA’s grassroots lobbying activi-
ties in the first term cost organizational capital that was absent from the 2012 re-election
campaign 5. Even if lobbying activity does not decrease the overall stock of organizational
capital, while it is being used for lobbying, it cannot be applied to electoral ends. As lob-
bying activity appears to push away activists and certainly diverts resources, presidential
5There is a strong possibility that PGLOs are created to increase the organizational capital available to
the campaign through “off-season” training and practice, and this will be revisited in future work (Trish,
2009; Melber, 2010).
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lobbying reduces the ability of PGLOs to engage in pre-election battlefield shaping activities
and the amount of organizational capital that can be used toward the next campaign, and
thus has an electoral cost. We also have reason to believe that the application of presidential
time to congressional and presidential election campaigns are of use to the president’s party
(Shaw, 1999; Herrnson and Morris, 2007). The effect of other forms of political advertising
seems to increase with proximity to Election Day, so it is reasonable to think the effect of
campaign appearances decays as well (Gerber et al., 2011). Thus, presidential time spent
making public appeals should also carry an electoral cost which increases with proximity to
election day and with the time costs of making a successful public appeal.
There is thus a great opportunity to consider targeted partisan appeals and mass per-
suasion attempts within the Canes-Wrone theoretical construct. Cameron lays out a clear
framework for the components which must make up a theory of public presidential leader-
ship (Cameron and Park, 2011). I make few, if any notable contributions to our theories
of how public opinion plays a role in legislating. Instead, I make three arguments. First,
PGLOs provide presidents with an avenue to selectively expose voters in the president’s
primary electorate to messages. Second, PGLOs may provide presidents with an avenue to
expose general electorate voters to presidential messages and persuade those voters to favor
the president’s policies. Third, the use of presidential time and organizational capital for
message exposure and opinion formation techniques carry an electoral cost for the president
and his party. I articulate this model in the next section 6.
6While there is evidence against this assumption, I assume that there is an uncontested media environ-
ment,as this lies beyond the scope of this project (Pluta and Woolley, 2014). I also do not explore the role
that these tactics may play in leading Congress to anticipate presidential action in a two-stage game, as
put forth in the original Canes-Wrone theory in order to focus on the menu of presidential tactics and their
electoral costs (Canes-Wrone, 2001a).
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An Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private
The mechanism by which presidents choose a tactic to influence Congress through grassroots
lobbying organizations will be illustrated through a single-stage model of lawmaking7. I build
on the work of Romer and Rosenthal 1978 and an extension by Canes-Wrone in her 2001
paper (Canes-Wrone, 2001a). In this prior work, the legislature either ignores the general
electorate or they are perfectly responsive when the president decides to make a public
appeal. The theory in this paper adds to the single-stage subgame of the Canes-Wrone
framework with an extension which allows the president to also take actions which lead the
pivotal legislator to be perfectly responsive to the median voter in the primary election of
the president’s party, or to vote in accordance with the presidential ideal point as a result of
indirect mass persuasion8
I assume in this case that there is a left of center president, and that his ideal point xj is
to the left of the general election median voter xv. Thus, I assume xj < xv.
9 Extant models
by Romer and Rosenthal as well as Canes-Wrone have treated the legislature as a unitary
actor, and when Canes-Wrone added a voter to the game, the voter is referred to as “the
legislature’s median voter,” which is presumably the median voter in a national electorate
(Canes-Wrone, 2006). The assumption that the legislature as a whole will be responsive to
the median voter in the national electorate is a strong one for a variety of reasons. Instead of
thinking of the legislature as a unitary actor, I treat the personal ideal point of the legislature,
xl, as the personal ideal point of the legislature’s median voter
10 and that the ideal point of
the voter, xv, is the ideal point of the median voter in the general electorate of the median
7In the future, the author hopes to extend this model to two stages and allow a donor to endow the
president with a grassroots lobbying capacity after re-election and observing his behavior in the first stage.
8For the sake of simplicity, I make the reasonable assumption that no actors will have equal ideal points.
9The findings here should also be generalizable to the case of a conservative president with a more liberal
general electorate.
10I assume that there are two parties, and each party’s members lie entirely on one side of xv, so by
extension I assume no overlap between parties.
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legislator.
I begin by assuming that legislators seek to pass a policy as close as possible to xf , their
induced ideal point, which is dependent on the lobbying action of the president. This induced
ideal point may be the median legislator’s personal ideal point, xl, the ideal point of their
general electorate median, xv, the ideal point of their primary electorate median, xa, or the
ideal point of the president, xj, if the president chooses to do nothing, make a public appeal,
make a targeted appeal to the primary electorate of the median legislator, or use his PGLO
to indirectly engage in mass persuasion, respectively. I assume that it is possible, though
extremely costly, for the president to influence the median legislator when he is in the other
party by making targeted appeals to the president’s co-partisans.
I make the strong assumption that the ordering of legislative ideal points from left to
right is identical to the ordering of general electorate median ideal points.11 I also make
the strong assumption that the president will lobby on a national basis, not tailoring his
strategy for particular districts.12 Thus, when the induced ideal point is equal to xv or xa,
the ordering of xf will be stable, and under any action there is a set median legislator whose
preferred policy will be the policy passed by the legislature.
The president, as suggested by Melber and Canes-Wrone, has tools at his disposal to
mobilize the public to pressure legislators on bills of his choosing (Canes-Wrone, 2001b,a;
Kernell, 2007; Beckmann, 2008; Melber, 2010). When the public is mobilized to put pressure
on legislators, legislators adapt by increasing their responsiveness toward the mobilized group
and this defines their induced ideal point13. If I begin with the assumptions made by Canes-
Wrone that the president has the ability to use his appeals to set the legislature’s induced
11I also assume the ordering of presidential party primary electorate ideal points follows the same pattern.
12The effect of tailored appeals is a phenomenon well worth investigating (Beckmann, 2008; Cohen, 2010),
but beyond the scope of this paper.
13I acknowledge that the president may use these tools selectively and incrementally to increase legislators’
relative salience of the general electorate, primary electorate or the legislators’ personal preferences. I hope
to explore this in future work, but for the purposes of this project, I retain the assumption that this process
is an all-or-nothing matter.
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ideal point perfectly equal to either the personal preferences of the legislature or the general
electorate median voter, theoretically, limiting the application of these appeals to the primary
electorate median voter should allow the president to force the legislature to adopt an induced
ideal point at xa. Leaders of OFA have also publicly stated that they believe they can use
OFA’s Neighbor-to-Neighbor program to unleash supporters to engage in mass persuasion of
the public (Plouffe, 2009; Melber, 2010). Accordingly, this paper takes this claim seriously
for theoretical purposes, and allows for the president to use mass persuasion to move the
median voter in the general electorate to his own preferred policy and in the process lead
the median legislator to be perfectly responsive to this persuaded voter.
I assume that the median primary voter, xa, lies to the left of xj and xl. This modeling
approach recognizes that elected officials are responsible not only to their general electorate,
but also to their primary electorate, as argued by Fenno (1978) among others. I assume that
the president has a unique ability to raise the salience of issues among his party’s primary
voters, and use this with varying costs to lead the median legislator to be perfectly responsive
to the median primary voter of the president’s party in his district. When the government
is unified, this voter will be the median voter in the median legislator’s primary electorate.
When the government is divided, this voter will not only lie outside of the median legislator’s
primary constituency, but will almost always lie outside the median legislator’s re-election
constituency. Accordingly, under divided government, the costs of using the president’s
unique targeted appeal capacity to induce legislative responsiveness to his copartisans will
be immensely higher than under unified government. In the course of this paper, for the sake
of simplicity, I will refer to the median voter of the president’s party’s primary electorate in
the district of the median legislator as the median primary voter, even though this voter is
not pivotal in the median legislator’s primary election when government is divided.
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The utility function of the median legislator is as follows:
Ul = −(xp − xf )2
xp represents the ideal point of the resulting policy (either xq or xb). This induced ideal
point, xf , adopts a different value as a result of different presidential actions, listed in Table
1. 14
The link between lobbying techniques and electoral consequences is provided in the form
of two resources which vary in their ability to produce votes for the president in federal
elections. Organizational capital, I, and presidential time, T , are expended when lobbying
tactics are used, and one unit of presidential time is as electorally productive at any given
time as r units of organizational capital. Public appeals are assumed to be made at the cost
of presidential time, as presidents conduct interviews with fractionalized media. Targeted
appeals and mass persuasion result in a loss of organizational capital as volunteers divert
their attention from electoral purposes to policy-related activities, burn out from lobbying,
and financial assets are expended in support of OFA-style grassroots lobbying campaigns.
The president’s utility function when he takes no lobbying action is assumed to be Up =
−(xp−xj)2+pi, where xp is the ideal point of enacted policy, and pi is the electoral productivity
of both I and T . I assume that any leftover presidential time or organizational capital
(human capital in the form of volunteers or financial assets) from his grassroots lobbying
organization can be applied to federal election campaigns (either for his own re-election, the
election of his successor, or for his party’s legislative candidates). In this one-stage game, I
set the total amount of electoral resources available to the president, I + Tr to be equal to
1. If the president chooses to do nothing there is no expenditure of time, financial assets, or
diversion/burnout of volunteer interest. However, if the president chooses to make a public
14For tractability, xl, xj , xv, xa, xq, xb > 0.
16
Table 1: Presidential Utilities and Induced Ideal Points
Presidential Action Resulting Legislative Preference Presidential Utility
Nothing xl Up = −(xp − xj)2 + pi
Public Appeal xv Up = −(xp − xj)2 + pi I+sTrI+Tr
Targeted Appeal xa Up = −(xp − xj)2 + pi pI+TrI+Tr
Mass Persuasion xp Up = −(xp − xj)2 + pi cI+TrI+Tr
appeal, a targeted appeal, or engage his PGLO in mass persuasion, his time that can be
allocated to electoral purposes is discounted by s, and his capital available for the next
presidential campaign is discounted by p or c, respectively. For this purposes of this project,
I assume that s, p, c ∈ [0, 1]15.
I now have all the components necessary to outline the path of play. In the first step,
the president determines which of the four strategies he will choose, Nothing, Public Appeal,
Targeted Appeal, or Mass Persuasion. This determines the median legislator’s induced ideal
point, xf . In the second step, the legislature selects and passes a bill, xb, or fails to pass a
bill. Finally, in the third step, if the legislature passes a bill, the president chooses to sign
or veto the bill. If the president signs the bill, it is enacted into law and xp = xb. If the
president vetoes the bill or the legislature fails to pass a bill, xp = xq. Assume that the
president will sign any bill equal to the status quo policy and that legislators will propose
bills only if it makes them strictly better off. I use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the
solution concept.
In the course of describing the structure of the game, it was assumed that xj < xv. Also,
if xl < xv, then xa < xj, xl < xv, and if xv < xl, then xa < xj < xv < xl. This yields
three cases for the ideological positions of the president, the median legislator and both
median voters (one with unified government and an extreme president, one with unified
15As referenced earlier, it is quite possible that engaging a PGLO in targeted appeals or mass persuasion
may increase human capital or volunteer retention through training and positive experiences, and increase
financial assets available for the future by providing fundraising opportunities. In future work I plan to relax
this assumption and allow p and/or c to be larger than 1.
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government and a moderate president, and one if there is divided government). If I do not
make any particular assumptions about the location of the status quo, this means there are
fifteen interesting subcases to examine. For each subcase, I will identify the strategy of the
president which yields the optimal outcome, and if applicable the conditions under which the
particular strategy is optimal. From this, I will derive a number of propositions regarding
optimal presidential lobbying strategies given the assumptions made.
I also assume that p approaches zero under divided government, and that under unified
government p > c. Detailed terms for the conditions under which each strategy is optimal
under each case may be found in Appendix 3.
Case I: Moderate President and Unified Government
First, consider the case in which the president lies between the median legislator (in his own
party) and that legislator’s general election median, or xa < xl < xj < xv.
When the status quo is to the right of the president’s ideal point, the strategy Nothing
maximizes his utility. So, when there is a moderate president and unified government, we
should expect public appeals to be uncommon when the status quo is generally further to the
right (as we may expect when a new Administration takes office following years of legislation
influenced by a president on the opposite side of the political spectrum).
When the status quo is to the left of the legislator’s ideal point and there is little ideo-
logical difference between the president and the median legislator, his utility is maximized
with the strategy Nothing. Nothing also maximizes the president’s utility when the status
quo lies between the legislator’s ideal point and that of the president and the president’s
ideal point is near the status quo. However, if the cost of successful mass persuasion is low,
through low diversion of organizational capital, high relative productivity of time, or orga-
nizational capital forms a relatively small proportion of the president’s available resources,
Mass Persuasion is optimal. In circumstances in which organizational capital is relatively
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more productive, organizational capital comprises most of the president’s electoral resources,
or the time cost of a public appeal is low, Public Appeal would be optimal.
Case II: Extreme President and Unified Government
Now I turn my attention to the case in which the median legislator has an ideal point to the
right of the president’s ideal point and to the left of his general election median, which has
the ordering xa < xj < xl < xv.
If the president is extreme under unified government, and the status quo policy lies to
the left of the president’s ideal point, the costless strategy of Nothing is weakly preferred.
In this case of an extreme president under unified government and when the status quo lies
to the right of both the president and the median legislator, the strategy Targeted Appeal
is preferred when the distance between the president and the median legislator is large in
comparison with the productivity of electoral resources and the electoral cost of making a
targeted appeal. The electoral cost of making a targeted appeal is small when the diversion
of organization capital needed to make a successful targeted appeal is small, time is relatively
productive compared to capital, or organizational capital forms a relatively small proportion
of the president’s resources. In other words, if the potential policy gains compared to doing
nothing are big enough to be be worth the lost election utility, it makes sense for the president
to work to make the median legislator more responsive to his primary electorate16. In Case
II, if the status quo lies betwen the president and the median legislator, the strategy Targeted
Appeal is preferred when the distance between the president and the status quo is large in
comparison with the relative value of electoral success to policy and the electoral cost of
making a targeted appeal.
16This presumes that mass persuasion is more costly to execute than targeted appeals.
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Case III: Divided Government
Finally, I discuss the case in which the median legislator’s preference is to the right of his
general election median’s preference and by assumption there is divided government, taking
the form xa < xj < xv < xl. In this case, the strategy Targeted Appeal must lead the median
legislator to become responsive to the median voter of the President’s (and opposing) party’s
primary electorate. As such, the cost of this strategy is substantially more expensive, if not
infinitely more expensive under divided government than united government.
In the divided government case, under plausible circumstances three of the four strategies
may be optimal. If the electoral cost17 of making a mass persuasion attempt is lower than
the cost of making a public appeal or a targeted partisan appeal, Mass Persuasion is optimal
when the distance between the president and the status quo is relatively high, and Nothing
is optimal otherwise. If, on the other hand, the electoral costs of Public Appeal are lower
than that required for a successful mass persuasion attempt, Public Appeal is optimal when
the general election median voter is relatively near to the president’s ideal point. Interest-
ingly, this suggests that public appeals are more likely to be optimal (and thus occur more
frequently) when presidents are popular not because the popularity is a resource that can
be spent, but because other lobbying alternatives are less cost-effective compared to public
appeals in that case.
In this same cost ordering, if the general election median voter is distant from the presi-
dent (and thus there are large gains to be made from mass persuasion) then Mass Persuasion
is optimal. However, if the status quo is to the left of the president in this case (which would
be somewhat unusual), or in other cases the status quo is sufficiently nearby the president,
the president can obtain his best policy by choosing the strategy Nothing.
I assume that under divided government, the president’s targeted appeal capacity to force
17The electoral cost of a given strategy is determined by the diversion of its associated resource required
by taking that strategy, the relative proportion of that resource as a share of the total resources available to
the president, and the relative productivity of the associated resource.
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the median legislator to be responsive to the president’s copartisans carries an extraordinarily
high cost due to the lack of incentives for the median legislator to be responsive to a group
of voters who are not in his re-election or primary constituencies. As a result, we should
expect c > p and that the strategy Targered Appeal is never optimal in Case III.
Consideration of the optimal strategies of the president in the cases of interest discussed
above, with the assumptions made, yields the following propositions:
Proposition 1. Under unified government, when the President is relatively extreme with a
status quo on the same side of him as the median general electorate voter, appealing to the
primary electorate median is preferred only if one or more of five conditions holds:
1. The distance between the status quo or the median legislator (whichever is closest to
the president) and the president is relatively large.
2. The electoral productivity of time and organizational capital is relatively small.
3. The organizational capital loss from successful primary lobbying is relatively small.
4. The relative productivity of organizational capital is low.
5. The share of organizational capital in the total amount of electoral resources is small.
Proposition 2. Mass persuasion is optimal if the status quo is on the same side of the
president as the median general electorate voter, government is divided, and one or more of
five conditions holds:
1. The distance between the status quo or the median legislator (whichever is closest to
the president) and the president is relatively large.
2. The electoral productivity of time and organizational capital is relatively small.
3. The organizational capital loss from successful mass persuasion is relatively small.
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4. The relative productivity of organizational capital is low.
5. The share of organizational capital in the total amount of electoral resources is small.
Proposition 3. Mass persuasion is optimal if the status quo is on the other side of the
president as the median general electorate voter, government is unified, and one or more of
five conditions holds:
1. The distance between the status quo or the median legislator (whichever is closest to
the president) and the president is relatively large.
2. The electoral productivity of time and organizational capital is relatively small.
3. The organizational capital loss from successful mass persuasion is relatively small.
4. The relative productivity of organizational capital is low.
5. The share of organizational capital in the total amount of electoral resources is small.
Proposition 4. When the President is relatively moderate with an extreme status quo under
unified government, appealing to the general election median is optimal when one or more of
five conditions holds:
1. The distance between the status quo or the median legislator (whichever is closest to
the president) and the president is relatively large.
2. The electoral productivity of time and organizational capital is relatively small.
3. The loss of presidential time from a successful public appeal is relatively small.
4. The relative productivity of presidential time is low.
5. The share of presidential time in the total amount of electoral resources is small.
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Proposition 5. When the status quo is on the other side of the median general electorate
voter from the president under unified government, and the distance between the president
and the median general electorate voter is small, appealing to the general election median is
optimal when one or more of four conditions holds:
1. The distance between the status quo or the median legislator (whichever is closest to
the president) and the president is relatively large.
2. The loss of presidential time from a successful public appeal is relatively small.
3. The relative productivity of presidential time is low.
4. The share of presidential time in the total amount of electoral resources is small.
Empirical Reflections
Hypotheses
The propositions laid forth in the previous section describe cases in which one of the four
strategies available to the president is his optimal strategy. This paper focuses on the
innovation of incorporating electoral costs of appeals, targeted partisan appeals and mass
persuasion attempts into models of ‘going public’ and in line with this priority, I use the
propositions to derive a number hypotheses regarding President Obama’s usage of OFA to
engage in targeted partisan appeals and mass persuasion. I also use the propositions to
generate hypotheses about how presidents over the past six decades have used their capacity
to make public appeals.
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Targeted Appeals Hypotheses
By Proposition 1, targeted appeals are only optimal when the government is unified, and
we should not expect to see the president utilize this tactic under divided government when
other tactics dominate making a targeted appeal. This yields the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Targeted appeals will occur more frequently under unified government.
Proposition 1 states that, conditional on unified government and the ideological position
of the president, targeted appeals are optimal when the electoral productivity of all resources
is sufficiently low. If we assume resources become more electorally productive as the election
becomes closer, targeted appeals should occur less frequently as the election nears. As the
available data exist only for one president and does not present substantial variation in the
ideological positions of the institutional players involved, this yields the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Under conditions of unified government, targeted appeals will occur less
frequently with proximity to the next federal election.
Mass Persuasion Hypotheses
Propositions 2 and 3 state that mass persuasion attempts are optimal in diverse institutional
configurations when the electoral productivity of all resources is sufficiently low. As discussed
for Hypothesis 2, as the next federal election approaches, the electoral productivity of both
presidential time and organizational capital increases, and mass persuasion is less likely to
be optimal for the president. This yields the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Mass persuasion attempts will occur less frequently with proximity to the
next federal election.
As stated in Propositions 2 and 3, mass persuasion attempts are optimal when the elec-
toral productivity of presidential time and organizational capital is sufficiently low. After
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the president faces the last election in which he is on the ballot, it is plausible to expect that
he may derive less utility from future election wins. Thus, following his re-election, policy
provides more utility to the president in relation to future election victories, and both forms
of capital are less productive in generating electoral utility compared to policy utility. Thus,
mass persuasion is more likely to be optimal for the president. This yields the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Mass persuasion attempts will occur more frequently following the president’s
re-election.
Public Appeals Hypotheses
Many data are available on public appeals, going back to the Eisenhower administration.
The Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private has a number of interesting implications
for the president’s use of his public appeals capacity.
Propositions 4 and 5 claim that public appeals are optimal, given the right institutional
conditions, when the loss of presidential time from a successful public appeal is small. As
discussed in 2010, as the media environment has fractured, in order for presidents to reach the
public, they must spend increasing amounts of time communicating through local television,
cable and soft news programs, and off television. Accordingly, when citizens have access
to and use more media, presidents must spend more time to make a public appeal, and
public appeals are less likely to be the optimal strategy for the president. This generates the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. Public appeals will occur less frequently when the percentage of the American
population with access to the Internet is greater.
Proposition 4 states that public appeals are optimal under unified government with an
moderate president if the relative productivity of presidential time is low compared to the
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relative productivity of organizational capital. Proposition 5 also states that if the relative
productivity of presidential time is low, public appeals are optimal under divided government.
Presidential time is used in campaigns for making advertisement-style appearances which
have a powerful but short term effect, and organizational capital can be used somewhat in
advance of an election to lay the groundwork of a get-out-the-vote campaign (Shaw, 1999).
I assume the relative productivity of presidential time begins quite low and gradually rises
throughout the cycle until it peaks on the day before an election18. This generates the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. Public appeals will occur less frequently with proximity to the next federal
election.
Data
Testing Targeted Appeals and Mass Persuasion Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1-4, outlined above, will be tested using data gathered from emails sent by
Organizing for America, Obama for America, and Organizing for Action between January
30, 2009, and August 7, 201419. The Organizing for America email list was transferred to
the Obama re-election organization in 2011 following his April 4 filing for re-election, and
in January 2013, the list was transferred from the Obama campaign organization to the
Organizing for Action nonprofit organization. From January 2009 until April 2011, a public
blog on the Organizing for America website included every email sent by Organizing for
18In the case of public appeals, the effect of the productivity of all election resources does not have a clear
effect under divided government, while it does for mass persuasion. So long as the productivity increase of all
electoral resources with time is larger than the relative productivity increase of presidential time compared
with organizational capital, we should expect time until the election to have a positive relationship with the
prevalence of mass persuasion attempts and public appeals.
19Access to emails was obtained by creating an account on www.barackobama.com, and providing the
author’s name, email address, and ZIP code. There were no terms of service for subscription to the OFA
email list, and the website terms of service were followed in the course of this research. Data from the
Organizing for America blog was obtained through the Internet Archive, a third party website.
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America domain email addresses which was not tagged as being sent by local leaders, and
these messages were noticeably written as forwarded letters rather than blog posts. During
a period in which data could not be collected through email, these letter posts were taken
from the blog and used to fill the gap in email coverage.
Targeted appeals are by design somewhat secretive, as their purpose is to raise the salience
of a particular issue among a targeted group of people through an appeal which is visible
by that group and not by others. Also, while successful mass persuasion campaigns should
be visible by the public which is being persuaded, a particularly ineffective mass persuasion
campaign may escape notice, though unlikely. Unlike primetime presidential addresses,
which are easily measured public appeals, it is possible that not all targeted appeals and
mass persuasion campaigns are visible and able to be picked up through emails. I presume
that there does exist some proportion of targeted appeals and mass persuasion campaigns
which are not captured in my email data. So long as the proportion of these tactics that
utilize OFA email lists remains relatively constant over time, it is possible to infer that
the frequency of using OFA emails to engage in both tactics is representative of the overall
frequency with which the president utilizes these tactics.
Based on this assumption, President Obama’s utilization of OFA in its three manifes-
tations to engage in targeted appeals and attempts at mass persuasion is considered repre-
sentative of the overall degree to which he was willing to use these two techniques from the
beginning of his first term to nearly the present day. These data, collected and presented as
288 weekly observations from January 30, 2009 to August 7, 2014, will be used to test the
first four hypotheses derived from the model presented above.
Targeted Appeals and Mass Persuasion Attempts. One hundred and eighty times
during this five and a half year period, this email list was used to encourage subscribers to
contact representatives on behalf of presidential priorities and engage in mass persuasion
campaigns in their neighborhoods. In order to be considered as a targeted appeal or mass
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persuasion attempt, the email had to have a clear prospective legislative policy goal, and
a clear action encouraged to influence a target. Pledges to take unspecified actions in the
future, petitions directed against special interests but not Congress, and messages concerning
executive orders and passed legislation were not considered, for example. Emails which met
this criterion which encouraged action to contact members of Congress alone (presumably
with the goal of increasing legislative responsiveness to a group synonymous with Democratic
primary voters) were coded as targeted appeals. Emails which met the aforementioned
criterion and encouraged action to influence the public (not just close ties of the recipient)
and encourage those individuals to pressure Congress were coded mass persuasion attempts.
Unified Government. I define the period of unified government as those weeks con-
taining any day between January 30, 2009, the beginning of the data set, and January 3,
2011, inclusive, when Republicans took control of the House of Representatives.
Lame Duck Status. I code all weeks which began after November 6, 2012 as a ’lame
duck’ week and consider this variable to represent a lower value of pi in comparison to other
weeks.
Proximity to Next Election. I include a variable for the number of weeks remaining
before the next federal election day.
I include a number of other controls which should influence the President’s usage of the
tactics I consider here and vary over the period specified. Honeymoon. I treat the period
starting with the day after a presidential election through the last day of the following March
as the president’s honeymoon period. Any week including a day in this period was coded
with an indicator for the presidential honeymoon.
Presidential Approval. We might expect that presidents may be more successful in
using all of their appeals and persuasion capacities when they are more popular, lowering
the cost of a successful appeal or persuasion attempt (Kernell, 2007). I control for presiden-
tial popularity by using the Gallup average presidential approval rating which most closely
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overlaps each weekly observation period20 (Gallup, 2014b).
Public Appeals. Additionally, when it is optimal for the president to make a public
appeal, it is not optimal for him to make targeted appeals or persuasion attempts. This
comes from a result that the president is never indifferent between public appeals and the
tactics of interest except in knife-edge cases. I also include a dummy variable for the week
in which a president makes an address, non-State of the Union speech to a joint session of
Congress, or press conference after 7 PM Eastern time, and for three weeks after, collected
from the American Presidency Project (Woolley, 2014).
Quarter. Finally, to capture seasonal variation in policy production as a result of
holidays, the August recess, and honeymoon periods, I include dummies for the first, second,
and third quarters of the year, using the fourth quarter as a reference point.
Using weekly counts of targeted appeals messages and mass persuasion attempts as de-
pendent variables, I regressed these variables on the controls described in the previous para-
graphs using a Poisson regression model. For each dependent variable, I first present a
parsimonious model focusing on unified government, proximity to the election, an interac-
tion between the two, and lame duck status, and then the full model with all controls. I also
present both models with and without the interaction term. The results of these analyses are
presented in the dot plot of Figure 1, and the full results of the analysis including diagnostics
are reported in Appendix 2 .
Targeted Appeals and Mass Persuasion Results
Examination of the targeted appeals regressions indicate that in support of Hypothesis 1,
targeted appeals are positively associated with unified government. This positive association
is statistically significant in the models with an interaction term between unified government
and time until the next federal election after the first three months of a president’s term has





















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Predicting Mass Persuasion Attempts
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passed. Targeted appeals also become less common as federal elections grow near, and
occurred more often following President Obama’s re-election.
The conditional coefficient of an additional week before a federal election when govern-
ment is unified is 0.003 with a standard error of 0.005 for Model 3, and 0.008 with a standard
error of 0.006 for Model 4. Neither of these conditional coefficients are statistically significant
at the .05 level. Thus, there is no support for Hypothesis 2 that targeted appeals are less
likely to occur as federal elections grow near when government is unified.
The results from the mass persuasion regressions indicate that in line with Hypothesis 3,
mass persuasion attempts do occur less frequently when the next federal election is near. As
mass persuasion can be optimal for the president under certain conditions for both unified
and divided government, we find that approaching elections are associated with reduced
frequencies of mass persuasion attempts through OFA by the Obama administration.
The data find that mass persuasion attempts through OFA were more likely following
the president’s re-election, which provides support for Hypothesis 4. The Electoral The-
ory of Going Public and Private clearly associates higher valuation of electoral utility with
fewer mass persuasion attempts within the available data (unlike targeted appeals and mass
persuasion) and this claim is supported.
These results are robust across model specifications. Each of the three independent
variables of interest are significant and positive across all four models for both targeted
appeals and mass persuasion. The conditional coefficient of unified government on weeks
until the next federal election for targeted appeals was significant and positive for 80% of
the observed values, and the conditional coefficient of weeks until the next federal election
on unified government for targeted appeals was insignificant for all models. Furthermore,
these results hold when a negative binomial model is estimated as well. Notably, apart
from a honeymoon effect in one model for targeted appeals and some quarterly effects, the
controls were not significant in the Poisson estimation, and they did not hold when a negative
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binomial model was used.
Testing Public Appeals Hypotheses
I test the two hypotheses generated by the Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private
using publicly available data on presidential public addresses. I use all quarter calendar years
from the first quarter of 1957 through the third quarter of 2014 as the units of observation.
Public Appeals. All presidential public television addresses, speeches to joint sessions
of Congress other than the State of the Union (or budget addresses given by newly inaugu-
rated presidents), and press conferences given after 7 PM Eastern are considered primetime
addresses. If a public address mentions a presidential priority and requests that Congress
take action on the president’s position on that priority, the public address is coded as a pub-
lic appeal. The addresses, speeches, and press conferences were obtained from the American
Presidency Project (Woolley, 2014). Using these identified public appeals, this variable was
coded for each quarter according to the sum total of public appeals in that quarter.
Proximity to Next Election. Proximity to the next federal election was coded by
setting the value of the first full quarter following a federal election as 7, and counting down
by quarter so the value of the fourth quarter of an even-numbered year is 0.
Internet Adoption. Internet adoption during a quarter year was obtained by using
the percentage of American adults who reported using the Internet to the Pew Internet and
American Life Project during that year (Pew Internet and American Life Project, 2014).
If multiple poll numbers were available for a given year, the average value was used for all
quarters in that year.
Year. I include the year of the quarterly observation in all models, including the base
model, so that the effect of Internet adoption may be distinguished from the passage of time.
Unified Government. I define quarters containing any day in which the president’s
party had a majority in both chambers of Congress, including instances when the Vice-
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President cast the deciding vote as having unified government, coded with an indicator.
Lame Duck. I code all quarters in which the president is serving in his second term for
the majority of the quarter with a ‘lame duck’ indicator.
Quarterly Average Presidential Job Approval. We might also expect that presi-
dents may be more successful in using all of their appeals and persuasion capacities when
they are more popular, lowering the cost of a successful appeal or persuasion attempt (Ker-
nell, 2007). I control for presidential popularity by using the Gallup average presidential
approval rating for the quarter which most closely overlaps each quarterly observation pe-
riod21 (Gallup, 2014a).
∆ in Gross Domestic Product. Strong economic performance may strengthen the
president’s political standing and give him capital that he would want to spend with a
public address (Canes-Wrone, 2006). I control for the change in each quarterly observation
period’s GDP in comparison to that quarter in the prior year, using data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis from 1956-2013 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2014).
Presidential Indicators. I capture personal variation in the usage of public appeals
through indicator variables created for the president whose term took up the majority of
the observed quarter (Canes-Wrone, 2001b, 2006). Indicators were created for Presidents
Kennedy through Obama, with Dwight Eisenhower serving as the reference category.
Quarterly Indicators. In order to capture seasonal variation in policy production as
a result of holidays, the August recess, and honeymoon periods, I include indicators for the
first, second, and third quarters of the year, using the fourth quarter as a reference category.
I regressed quarterly counts of public appeals on the independent variables of interest and
controls described above using a Poisson regression model. I present a base model including
only Internet adoption rates, quarters until the next federal election, and the year, and also
the full model with all controls. The results are presented in the dot plot of Figure 4 with
21The quarterly observation periods overlap Gallup’s quarterly data by 11 weeks.
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specific coefficients, standard errors and diagnostic information reported in Appendix 2. I
performed the same regressions using negative binomial models and in the few instances
where there were differences, none of them relevant to the hypotheses, the differences are
noted in Appendix 2.
Public Appeals Results
We find in the output of the regression model that net adoption is negatively and signifi-
cantly associated with the number of public appeals given by a president in a given quarter.
Net adoption was valued at 0 until 1994, increased to 61 percent by 2001, and has since
increased to 87 percent, with notable fluctuation and periods of stagnation and even tempo-
rary declines. Net adoption is significant even when controlling for year and percent change
in GDP year over year, providing support for Hypothesis 5. As media fractionalization is
arguably raising the amount of time needed by presidents to conduct a public appeal (Cohen,
2010), as predicted by the Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private, when the loss of
presidential time from successfully making a public appeal grows, public appeals are less
common.
The Poisson model estimates find that there is a positive and significant relationship
between the number of quarters remaining until the next federal election and the frequency
of public appeals in a given quarter. This relationship is robust to both the base and full
specifications, providing support for Hypothesis 6. As predicted by the Electoral Theory of
Going Public and Private, when the relative electoral productivity of presidential time to
organizational capital is low, public appeals are more common.
Notably, the models provide little evidence that significant relationships exist between
the number of public appeals given in a quarter and other variables such as presidential
popularity and change in GDP that are held to be important predictors of public appeals.




























































































































Figure 5: Predicting Public Appeals
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both President George W. Bush and President Obama were positive and significant at the
.1 level, and increased from Bush to Obama. The relationships between the independent
variables of interest are robust to alternative specifications and hold when estimated using
a negative binomial model.
Discussion
The analyses presented above show considerable and robust support for many of the hy-
potheses generated by the Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private. First and foremost,
public appeals, targeted appeals and indirect mass persuasion all decreased as the electoral
productivity of organizational capital increased with proximity to federal elections, providing
a strong foundation for future exploration of the electoral costs of presidential vote-centered
lobbying. However, there are still some notable surprises. Interestingly, mass persuasion
attempts share most of the same relationships with key predictors as targeted appeals. This
overall finding, as well as the fact that mass persuasion attempts require targeted messages
to the presidents’ copartisan voters, suggests that what is observed as an attempt to lead
opinion in the general electorate might be viewed by the president first as an instrument to
raise the salience of an issue among his party’s primary voters. This finding calls for further
study of attempts by presidential grassroots lobbying organizations to lead opinion indirectly
through organized mass persuasion campaigns. There is an opportunity to use lab experi-
ments to test both for the effectiveness of indirect persuasion on behalf of politicians under
varied conditions, as well as to test for the effect of participating in a grassroots persuasion
campaign on the participants’ own beliefs and issue salience. Greater familiarity with the
empirical support for both of these microfoundations would assist in constructing creative
research designs to capture the effectiveness of these campaigns in achieving either direction
in the real world. These studies would also help in calibrating the cost assumptions in the
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Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private so more attention may be paid to the most
plausible cases.
The positive relationship between both forms of targeted appeals (assuming mass persua-
sion attempts are, in fact, a form of targeted appeal) and unified government suggests that
there is a substantial amount of targeted appeals in periods of divided government. While
the somewhat weak nature of this relationship may appear to undermine the Electoral The-
ory of Going Public and Private, it would be consistent with the possibility that targeted
appeals may, to a point, increase organizational capital. The techniques used in targeted
appeals and mass persuasion are often very similar to those used in election campaigns, and
a modest amount of practice during the political “offseason” may improve the human capital
of those who do volunteer enough to offset some dropoff from people who leave the organi-
zation as a result of the appeals. Future extensions of the model to allow for a negative cost
and non-linear cost function would be able to reflect this possibility which seems supported
by the existing data.
Targeted appeals did not decrease as election grew nearer under unified government as
hypothesized, though they did decrease with electoral proximity overall. If targeted appeals
and indirect mass persuasion have the ability to train activists and increase organizational
capital in the future in exchange for short term costs to electoral ends, both tactics can serve
as a form of investment. If policy is extremely important to the president, throughout periods
of unified government both tactics would be used at high levels, while they would be used
more in divided government when elections are distant, creating the observed relationships.
There is another interesting puzzle in the finding that targeted appeals have been more
prevalent following President Obama’s re-election, which has been a period of divided gov-
ernment. In this case, there should be little policy gain from targeted appeals, with relatively
less utility gained from electoral investment, yet targeted appeals have been used more often
than in the first term. However, if President Obama derives significant utility from holding
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organizational capital in itself, it would make sense that he use the second term to invest in
building up this capital if mass persuasion is ineffective in general and divided government
makes targeted appeals ineffective as well. This has some face validity, as President Obama
is famously known for referring himself to a community organizer who hates politics, and
Organizing for Action (as opposed to Organizing for America) is incorporated as a non-profit
organization with significant restrictions on its election activities, and will be under Barack
Obama’s control after he leaves the White House.
The Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private also provides insights into the pres-
ident’s use of public appeals. As the election grows closer and candidate time becomes
more electorally productive compared to capital, public appeals do become less likely. The
time costs to the president of making a public appeal have increased significantly, and the
Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private would indicate that this should be associated
with fewer public appeals. The data back this up, as Internet adoption rates have a robust
negative association with the likelihood of public appeals, even when controlling for time
and presidential fixed effects. This suggests that the Internet played a big role in increasing
the costs of making public appeals.
Also, the election strategies of the president appear to have an effect through altering the
relative productivity of organizational capital and presidential time. At the .1 significance
level, President Bush and President Obama were more likely to make public appeals than
other presidents since 1957, even controlling for time and media fractionalization. There
are a number of possible ways to interpret these coefficients, including considering personal
differences in President Bush and President Obama’s personalities. However, both of these
presidents are known to have organized polarizing electoral campaigns notably oriented to-
ward mobilizing their own base rather than persuading independents. For these presidents,
who take other steps to focus on turning out the base over persuasion, it is plausible that the
relative productivity of organizational capital to time is higher, making time less electorally
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valuable and thus increasing the likelihood of public appeals.
This paper is the first to assign electoral costs to public presidential lobbying tactics
and the whole menu of public presidency vote-oriented lobbying tactics. It also presents
evidence that the tactics used by presidents to interact with the public are influenced by
electoral considerations, and that presidents behave as if targeted appeals (in the form of
overt appeals or covert ”mass persuasion” campaigns) to their own party base provide real
opportunities to influence legislators through their primary election constituencies. The
Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private as well as some puzzles emerging from the
empirical analysis in this paper offer a wide variety of avenues for future work. First of
all, the immediate next step will be to incorporate direct lobbying through distribution of
federal spending into the theory and empirics, in order to construct a comprehensive electoral
theory of vote-centered presidential lobbying. Recent work shows support for the claim that
presidents allocate federal spending to competitive districts in the presidential election, so
deviation in federal spending from this pattern toward legislatively pivotal districts would
serve as a measure of direct lobbying (Kang, 2014). Additionally, extending the dataset
to the end of the Obama presidency and incorporating data from George W. Bush’s GOP
Team Leader project would offer opportunities to test many more hypotheses derived from
this theory. Incorporating diminishing returns from lobbying and allowing the president to
mix between tactics would further enrich the comprehensive electoral theory of vote-centered
presidential lobbying.
An additional and important next step is to build off of these findings regarding presiden-
tial behavior and search for evidence that each of these tactics works in the way presumed
in the model. Cameron wrote that theories of the public presidency must consider media
dissemination, opinion change, and signaling to legislators, and it is essential that we work
to understand how and if targeted partisan appeals and mass persuasion attempts effectively
achieve each of these three tasks, and at what electoral cost to the president. Finally, it is
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very important that at some point, the competitive messaging environment is taken into
account, as there appear to be some structural advantages for the president’s opposition
(Pluta and Woolley, 2014).
Conclusion
This paper makes two major contributions to the public presidency literature. First, it is
the first to explicitly model the electoral resource costs to the president of taking action
rather than assuming an opportunity cost. Second, it is the first to model opportunities
presidents have to use PGLOs to indirectly persuade the public and leverage presidential
supporters in order to pressure Congress to pass legislation desired by the president. The
empirical evidence shows strong relationships between low incidence of these lobbying tactics
and circumstances when these tactics would carry a high electoral cost. Furthermore, when
the hypotheses generated by the model do fail, there are reasonable extensions to the model
that may explain these puzzles.
The Electoral Theory of Going Public and Private provides an interesting foundation for
development of a comprehensive electoral theory of vote-centered presidential lobbying, as
well as many comparative statics which cannot currently be tested due to a lack of data.
Enriching this theory to test some alternative explanations suggested by puzzling empirical
findings will also help enhance our understanding of presidential tactical decision-making.
This approach offers much leverage for understanding vote-centered presidential lobbying,
but there is much more exciting work to be done in the near and intermediate terms to
consolidate and build on these foundations.
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Appendix 1: Optimal Strategies and Conditions
Table 2: Case I Optimal Strategies
Ideal Point Configurations Presidential Optimal Strategy
xq < xa < xl < xj < xv Nothing preferred if (xj − xl)2 < pi(1 − c)(1 − Tr) and (1 − s)Tr > (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
Mass Persuasion preferred if (xj − xl)2 > pi(1 − c)(1 − Tr) and (1 − s)Tr > (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
Nothing preferred if (xj − xl)2 < (1 − s)Trpi and (1 − s)Tr < (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
Public Appeals preferred if (xj − xl)2 > (1 − s)Trpi and (1 − s)Tr < (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
xa < xq < xl < xj < xv Nothing preferred if (xj − xl)2 < pi(1 − c)(1 − Tr) and (1 − s)Tr > (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
Mass Persuasion preferred if (xj − xl)2 > pi(1 − c)(1 − Tr) and (1 − s)Tr > (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
Nothing preferred if (xj − xl)2 < (1 − s)Trpi and (1 − s)Tr < (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
Public Appeals preferred if (xj − xl)2 > (1 − s)Trpi and (1 − s)Tr < (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
xa < xl < xq < xj < xv Nothing preferred if (xj − xq)2 < pi(1 − c)(1 − Tr) and (1 − s)Tr > (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
Mass Persuasion preferred if (xj − xq)2 > pi(1 − c)(1 − Tr) and (1 − s)Tr > (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
Nothing preferred if (xj − xq)2 < (1 − s)Trpi and (1 − s)Tr < (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
Public Appeals preferred if (xj − xq)2 > (1 − s)Trpi and (1 − s)Tr < (1 − c)(1 − Tr)
xa < xl < xj < xq < xv Nothing preferred
xa < xl < xj < xv < xq Nothing preferred
Table 3: Case II Optimal Strategies
Ideal Point Configurations Presidential Optimal Strategy
xq < xa < xj < xl < xv Nothing preferred
xa < xq < xj < xl < xv Nothing preferred
xa < xj < xq < xl < xv Nothing preferred if (xj − xq)2 < (1 − p)(1 − Tr)pi
Targeted Appeal preferred if (xj − xq)2 > (1 − p)(1 − Tr)pi
xa < xj < xl < xq < xv Nothing preferred if (xj − xl)2 < (1 − p)(1 − Tr)pi
Targeted Appeal preferred if (xj − xl)2 > (1 − p)(1 − Tr)pi
xa < xj < xl < xv < xq Nothing preferred if (xj − xl)2 < (1 − p)(1 − Tr)pi




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Regression Estimates
Table 5: Predicting the Number of Weekly Targeted Appeals, 2009-2014
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Unified Government 1.035∗∗∗ 1.414∗∗∗ 2.196∗∗∗ 2.242∗∗∗
(0.282) (0.343) (0.514) (0.540)
Weeks Until Federal Election 0.011∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Unified*Weeks Until Election − − −0.020∗∗ −0.015∗
− − (0.007) (0.008)
Lame Duck 1.368∗∗∗ 1.424∗∗∗ 1.383∗∗∗ 1.438∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.297) (0.283) (0.301)
Honeymoon −0.475 −0.139 −0.760∗ −0.456
(0.294) (0.383) (0.321) (0.409)
Avg. Presidential Approval − −0.038 − −0.028
− (0.026) − (0.028)
Recent Presidential Address − 0.479 − 0.363
− (0.286) − (0.291)
Q1 − 0.319 − 0.275
− (0.296) − (0.287)
Q2 − 0.660∗ − 0.525
− (0.306) − (0.305)
Q3 − 0.251 − 0.151
− (0.305) − (0.302)
Constant −2.320∗∗∗ −1.308 −2.986∗∗∗ −2.124
(0.321) (1.075) (0.437) (1.186)
AIC 504.29 505.51 498.44 503.14
BIC 522.60 542.14 520.42 543.43
Log Likelihood −247.1443 −242.7567 −243.2192 −240.5701
Deviance 292.13 283.35 284.28 278.98
Num. obs. 288 288 288 288
Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Values presented are Poisson estimates predicting the number of targeted appeals messages sent by OFA per
week. Standard errors are in parentheses and observations are weeks beginning with January 30, 2009, and
ending with the last day of the last week on August 7, 2014. Estimation of the same specifications using
a negative binomial model resulted in no changes in direction or significance with the exception of Q2 in
Model 2, Honeymoon in Model 3, and the interaction term in Model 4, which are significant at the .1 level.
53
Table 6: Predicting the Number of Weekly Mass Persuasion Attempts, 2009-2014
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Unified Government 2.073∗∗∗ 2.046∗∗ 3.762∗∗ 4.233∗∗
(0.610) (0.776) (1.207) (1.462)
Weeks Until Federal Election 0.023∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
Unified*Weeks Until Election − − −0.024 −0.033∗
− − (0.014) (0.016)
Lame Duck 1.476∗ 1.616∗ 1.422∗ 1.631∗
(0.645) (0.692) (0.660) (0.746)
Honeymoon 0.275 0.044 0.005 −0.330
(0.378) (0.672) (0.437) (0.692)
Avg. Presidential Approval − 0.017 − 0.040
− (0.045) − (0.049)
Recent Presidential Address − −0.234 − −0.315
− (0.779) − (0.791)
Q1 − 1.283∗ − 1.295∗
− (0.634) − (0.584)
Q2 − 1.502∗ − 1.328
− (0.719) − (0.696)
Q3 − 1.320∗ − 1.248
− (0.661) − (0.646)
Constant −4.730∗∗∗ −7.084∗∗∗ −6.011∗∗∗ −9.595∗∗∗
(0.707) (1.780) (1.137) (2.287)
AIC 253.54 248.87 252.30 246.17
BIC 275.49 285.50 278.07 286.46
Log Likelihood −129.7562 −114.4363 −119.2139 −112.0856
Deviance 157.64 142.97 154.40 138.27
Num. obs. 288 288 288 288
Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Values presented are Poisson estimates predicting the number of mass persuasion attempt messages
sent by OFA per week. Standard errors are in parentheses and observations are weeks beginning
with January 30, 2009, and ending with the last day of the last week on August 7, 2014. Estimation
of the same specifications using a negative binomial model resulted in no changes in direction or
significance with the exception of Q3 for Model 2, which is are significant at the .1 level.
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Table 7: Predicting the Number of Quarterly Public Appeals, 1957-2014
Model 1 Model 2
Quarters Until Federal Election 0.103∗∗ 0.098∗
(0.035) (0.044)






Lame Duck − 0.184
− (0.381)
Qtr. Avg. Presidential Approval − −0.006
− (0.009)














Log Likelihood −239.0663 −212.9747
Deviance 233.66 181.48
Num. obs. 231 231
Two-tailed tests: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Values presented are Poisson estimates predicting the number of public appeals delivered by the
president per quarter. Standard errors are in parentheses and observations are quarter years be-
ginning with the first quarter of 1957, and ending with the third quarter of 2014. Estimation
of the same specifications using a negative binomial model resulted in no changes in direction or
significance in any coefficient.
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